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Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia Disputes 
 
                                   Daniel D. Kendie, P.hD 
Abstract:                                                                                        Prairie View A&M University 
 
  The 46-year-old dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia has been commonly called a “border dispute.”   
Contrary to that description, it may   be more appropriate to portray it as a   dispute that has been driven 
principally by economic interests and by the effort to control scarce resources. Among these interests and 
resources are  the following:  the struggle for water wells and fresh grazing pastures for nomads; the 
insecurity Somalia feels about the Juba and the Wabi Shibeli rivers, as their sources are in Ethiopia; the 
discovery of gas and oil in the Ogaden; Somalia’s challenging geographic shape that   makes 
communication between the north and the south cumbersome in transport terms, in the sense that a road 
through the Ogaden could reduce the distance by 50%; and Ethiopia’s long standing trade needs for outlets 
to the sea through Somalia's Indian Ocean ports. Furthermore, the uneven distribution of resources, 
environmental degradation, drought, desertification, and widespread poverty create propitious grounds for 
violence.  Under such circumstances, economics is overlaid on ethnicity, and economic problems pass 
either for border disputes   or for ethnic and religious conflicts between the two countries. Somalia and 
Ethiopia have not been able to resolve the conflict as speedily as possible so that both countries could 
attend to the many pressing social and economic problems that have been crying out for solutions. There 
have been diplomatic attempts - both bilateral and multilateral - to solve the problem, but in vain. Even 
military means have been utilized, only to result in creating more problems and   the further 
impoverishment and suffering of the peoples of both countries.  What about economic cooperation?  It has 
never been attempted. It is an approach worth taking. The resumption of trade, communications, and other 
exchanges between formerly warring parties has been known to ameliorate historical enmities between 
states. Development cooperation could be conducted under the umbrella of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
Joint financing of multi-purpose dams on the two rivers; cooperation in such area as agricultural research; 
education and public health; afforestation; settlement of nomads; integrated rural development; the building 
of roads and the common infrastructure for trade and other purposes; cooperation in the  exploitation of gas 
and oil deposits ; and so on, could be carried out.  Even some measure of development cooperation can 
open possibilities for political accommodation.  And once the benefits of cooperation, however limited, are 
demonstrated, they can have multiplier effects to change perceptions, and open the way for increased 
cooperation and integration. The envisaged cooperation can assuage internal frictions, minimize external 
interference, especially now that of Islamic fundamentalism in the affairs of the two countries, and create 
propitious conditions to help address various bilateral questions, including the overlapping problems of 
nomadism and incessant drought, and facilitate the wide-spread mobilization of resources for growth and 
development.   As the economies of the two countries evolve into modern surplus economies, the 
interdependence between the different regions for sources of supply and markets can be enhanced, and that 
would contribute to peace and stability.  In time, the border would hopefully lose its significance and 
meaning. In order to understand the complex problems of the relations of the two countries, a brief 
appraisal of the historical background would be helpful.  
                                                   Brief Historical Background: 
The Horn of Africa has been the site of one of the largest externally funded 
military build-ups in the Third World that was undertaken by a wide array of foreign 
powers. As a result, it has experienced some of the bloodiest conflicts in recent memory. 
The primary causes of these conflicts have been super-power rivalry for hegemony in the 
region, on one hand, and at the local level, competition over a declining resource base, on 
the other. The history of the sub-region includes massive population movements pushed 
by other groups and pulled by the search for better pasture, farmlands, and water 
resources. The sub-region has also some of the highest population growth rates. 
Cultivable land is becoming limited, and intense farming and grazing are depleting soils.1 
To be sure, over the last forty years, the Horn of Africa has been virtually 
synonymous with crisis. Civil wars, inter-state wars, proxy wars, incursions of Islamic 
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fundamentalism, assertive sovereignty, clan conflicts, power struggles, economic 
competition, bloody revolutions, famine, refugee flows, brutal dictatorships, state 
collapse, war lordism, and unremitting poverty have all been, one way or the other, the 
chief images and realities associated with the sub-region.2   The conflicts between the 
Somalis and the Ethiopians have contributed, directly or indirectly, the lion’s share to 
such a state of affairs. 
Addressing the Addis Ababa Heads of State Summit of 1963, which created the 
Organization of African Unity, President Aden Abdullah Osman of Somalia said: 
“Ethiopia has taken possession of a large portion of Somali territory without the consent 
and against the wishes of the inhabitants. The Somali government has no claims for 
territorial aggrandizement, but is asking for the application of the principle of self-
determination. ”3  
In exercising his right of reply, Prime Minister Aklilou Habte Wolde of Ethiopia 
argued, “the statement made by the Somali leader was an outrageous and an unthinkable 
accusation, without any factual basis. The historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretched from 
the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. That is a fact.  
There is no record in history either of a Somali State or a Somali nation. I regret to say it, 
but that too is a fact. An international treaty regulates the frontiers between the two 
countries. If the Somali Republic does not recognize the treaty, then it will not even exist. 
If he is not seeking territorial aggrandizement, then, what is he seeking? On what does he 
base the claim? On linguistic reasoning or on religious grounds?”4  
From the Ethiopian standpoint, no doubt, the well-known Somali port of Zeila 
was controlled by the ancient Ethiopian Kingdom of Axum and was one of its major 
outlets to the sea. Having recovered Massawa from the Arabs in 854, 5  Ethiopia still 
continued to control the Port of Zeila in 977 A.D.6  Zeila was again recovered by 
Emperor Amde Tsion [1312-1342] when he reduced Muslim principalities like Ifat and 
Fatagar to tributary states in 1328.7 In 1332, all hostile Muslim states were brought under 
one ruler, Jamal al-Din, who paid tribute to the Ethiopian central government.8  Zeila was 
again re-conquered by Negus Dawit [1382-1411] and in 1415 by Negus Yeshaque (1414-
1429), and it remained an important trade centre between Ethiopia and Arabia in the 14,th  
15th and 16th centuries. Adal and Mogadisho were defeated in 1445 by the forces of 
Emperor Zere Yacob [Emperor 1434-1468], and control of the southern trade routes were 
secured. 9    
The word “Somali” appeared for the first time in the victory celebration songs of 
Negus Yeshaque.10 There after, commercial centres like Mogadisho, Brava and Merca 
became dependent for their prosperity upon the entrepot trade between Ethiopia and 
Arabia and the markets of the East. Having brought an end to Harar as a military power 
in 1577,   the Emperor Sertse Dengil (1563-1597),11  also led an expedition and recovered 
Inarya- today’s Illubabor and Kefa Provinces in 1586.12   
  As far as Somalia is concerned, our knowledge of its pre-colonial history is not 
anchored on certified scholarship because it has not been systematically studied. In fact, 
hardly any archeological research has been done. Whatever little is known about Somalia, 
is largely based on oral tradition.  For example, let us take the word Somali or “Samaal.”  
“Sa” means cow, and “maal” means milk, indicating a culture of nomadism, which can 
be explained as a response of the people to the ecological conditions of the terrain. 
Because of the scant rainfall and absence of rivers and lakes in much of the country, the 
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nomads and their livestock – camels, goats, sheep and cattle- are constantly on the move, 
in search of fresh pasturage and water. In the process, they cover long distances in a 
single year. Such economic and   social conditions make the writing of history extremely 
difficult, especially in the absence of a written language.13     
According to I.M Lewis, one of the doyens of Somali studies, the Somalis are a 
pastoral people, as they have always been. They expanded from the shores of the Gulf of 
Aden to the plains of Northern Kenya, and that it is generally assumed that the north was 
largely inhabited by the Galla and the south by Bantu speaking groups before the Somali 
migrations westward and southward from the 10th to the 19th centuries pushed them into 
their present areas. By the end of the 17th century, the Galla, whose strength must have 
been considerably reduced by their great thrusts into Ethiopia, had lost to the Somali all 
their former territory as far south as the Juba.14  Lewis observes that the Somalis have 
been congeries of disunited and often hostile clans which themselves were regularly 
divided by bitter internecine feuds and periodical raiding and looting between clans and 
upon caravans was normal. 15  
On the other hand, Herbert Lewis provides a different perspective. By relying on 
language distribution and migration theories, he places the homeland of the Somalis not 
on the shores of the Gulf of Aden, but in Southern Ethiopia. 16 If Herbert Lewis is sound 
in his conclusion, we could then raise a legitimate question: Why would Somalis abandon 
the fertile plains of southern Ethiopia and choose nomadism as a way of life in the deserts 
of Somalia? According to William Zartman, the Somali nation is   not a historic kingdom 
or a centralized social unit, but a segmented identity and kinship group, where four out of 
every five inhabitants are nomads, forced to move from place to place to find the next 
source of water and nourishment when its current pasture is worn out, and that they 
crossed the Juba River in the 1840s, and by 1910, had reached the Tana River, in East 
Africa. The very idea of a state is, therefore, totally alien to Somali culture, and was 
unknown to them before the colonial period. A settled population is needed before any 
form of state can be established. There had never been enough economic surpluses for 
that to happen. Nomadic society is essentially anarchic. But this is not to deny the 
existence of Arabized trading city-states in the form of mini sultanates that had been set 
from the 14th to the 19th century. However, these were oriented towards the sea and never 
controlled the hinterland.17  
Somalia had, therefore, never constituted either a political or an administrative 
entity before 1960. Part of it was controlled by the Ottoman Turks, part of it by the Arabs 
and the Persians, and part of it by the Omanis from Zanzibar. The Italians paid   
40, 000 Indian rupees to the Sultan of Zanzibar, and agreed to pay an annual rent of 160, 
000 for Mogadisho, and Brava.18  Ahmed-ibn-Ibrahim (1527-1548), or Gragne [the left 
handed], as the Ethiopians call him, employed the services of a large number of Egyptian 
mercenaries in his fifteen year plunder of Ethiopia. The military support he had obtained 
from the Ottomans and his use of the Egyptians was to provide the “historical” basis of 
Egypt’s 1874-1876 claims to the Ethiopian province of Harar.19   
                                
   The Colonial Period:  
The British established themselves in what was to become British 
Somaliland - a country of 180, 000 sq. kms with half a million inhabitants, in 
order to control the strategic Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and to keep an eye on the 
 4 
French, who had already established   themselves in Djibouti.  At the same time, 
they sought to find a source of cheap food supplies for their garrison in Aden, 
where they had 182 officers.20 Largely encouraged by the British, the Italians took 
over southern Somaliland, in order to serve London as a counterweight to France 
and to watch Ethiopia. But after the Ethiopians dealt a crushing defeat to the 
Italian army at the historic Battle of Adwa in 1896 - the British, French and 
Italians all felt constrained to make their own arrangements and to establish 
boundary lines with Ethiopia – the only indigenous state capable of holding its 
own with the European powers in the Horn of Africa.21 As a result, they signed a 
series of boundary agreements with Ethiopia in 1897, something that the Somali 
nomads had no need for or had   encountered before. Accordingly, the boundary 
between Ethiopia and what became British Somaliland was agreed upon in 1897 
and marked on the ground by a joint commission in 1932-1934. To that end, 
concrete posts were installed to mark the boundary line. The boundary separated 
some Somali tribes from either side of the border. However, an agreement 
annexed to the Treaty provided freedom to cross the border for grazing 
purposes.22 
         Likewise, in 1897, Ethiopia and Italy negotiated the boundary line between Ethiopia 
and what had become Italian Somaliland. They agreed upon a boundary and marked it on 
two maps, but did not put the agreement in writing. The maps disappeared and have 
never been found. Italy claimed that the agreed boundary lay about 180 miles inland 
parallel to the Indian Ocean coast.  Ethiopia claimed that the boundary was much nearer 
to the coast. In an attempt to settle the dispute, the parties entered into a second 
agreement, and hence, the Convention of 1908. Article IV of the Convention, among 
other things, declares, “That all of the Ogaden, and all of the tribes towards the Ogaden, 
shall “remain” dependent on Abyssinia [Ethiopia.].” In case people miss the point, 
Ethiopians underline the word   remain to stress that the Ogaden was Ethiopian in the 
first place.23 
  An Italo-Ethiopian joint boundary commission was appointed in 1911 to mark the 
boundary on the ground. Demarcation was progressing well, when suddenly; the Italian 
team was recalled home because of the breaking out of the Italo-Turkish war. With the 
coming to power of Benito Mussolini in 1922, far from carrying out its obligations to 
complete marking the boundary line on the ground, Fascist Italy had a different political 
agenda, i.e., to revenge the defeat at Adwa, and possibly colonize Ethiopia.  In 1934, it 
used the unmarked border as a pretext to occupy Wal-Wal - a village located 60 miles 
inside Ethiopia. But when   the Ethiopians fiercely resisted the occupation, Italy branded 
them “aggressors” for defending what was internationally recognized as an Ethiopian 
territory.24 
Both Italy and Ethiopia were members of the League of Nations. The Covenant of 
the League bound the members to respect and to preserve against aggression their 
independence and territorial integrity and not to employ force for the settlement of a 
dispute until they had first submitted it to the League or to arbitrators. 25 When Ethiopia 
submitted the case to the League of Nations, the League accepted the 1908 Convention as 
a legal basis for solving the boundary dispute, and recommended that it be demarcated on 
the ground.  However, prompted by the rapid increase in population and a lack of raw 
materials, and itching to avenge its defeat at the Adwa debacle of 1896, Fascist Italy used 
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the Wal-Wal incident as an excuse to commit its unprovoked and premeditated 
aggression against Ethiopia (1934-1941).26 
 For the Italian Minister Titoni, Ethiopia was the main target for Italian expansion, 
especially after achieving the occupation of southern Somalia. Indeed, Italy regarded 
Somalia only as a means of penetrating Ethiopia and for using it as a base for conducting 
military operations.27 To that end, some 30,000–40,000 Somalis, including former 
President Siad Barre were mobilized in the service of Italian colonialism.28 Fascist Italy 
attacked Ethiopia by mobilizing 800, 000 soldiers, 600 aircraft, 400 tanks and 30,000 
transport vehicles, as well as by the extensive use of mustard gas. 29 
  Ethiopia made no threats, mobilized no troops and issued no proclamations. But 
nevertheless, Mussolini made no secret of his intensions. The western powers were guilty 
of a clean breach of treaty obligations. They were supplying and selling arms to Italy. 
However, Ethiopia- the victim of aggression- was refused permission to buy even six 
airplanes from surplus British government stocks. Invoking Article Ten of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, Ethiopia applied for a loan of 10 million pounds, Britain and 
France opposed the loan. It was a gross injustice and a cardinal sin, in which, the victim 
of aggression was sacrificed at the altar of political expediency. Courageous peasants 
turned soldiers overnight, fought with limitless courage against a mechanized brutal 
enemy, and turned the tide of the war. 
 After the defeat of Fascist Italy in 1941, the entire Horn of Africa, including what 
was yet to become Somalia, was brought under British Military Administration for some 
ten years. But in 1950, the Somaliland Protectorate was mandated to Italy as a U.N. Trust 
Territory. As such, since the 500 mile border of the southern section of Somalia’s 
boundary with Ethiopia had not still been marked on the ground, the U.N. General 
Assembly recommended that the governments of Ethiopia and Italy expedite their current 
direct negotiations so that the question of frontiers could be settled as soon as possible. 30 
The U.N. Trusteeship agreement on Somalia also stipulated that Somalia’s boundaries 
with Ethiopia should  be those fixed by international agreements, and in so far as they 
were not already delimited, should be delimited in accordance with a procedure approved 
by the General Assembly.31  
Both sides accepted the principles of the 1908 Convention. Accordingly, 
negotiations began in 1955. There were eighteen meetings between Ethiopia and Italy, 
which took place in Addis Ababa.  The Somali leaders expressed no reservations on the 
negotiations. In February 1956, the Italian delegate spent ten days in Mogadisho. During 
his stay there, he was able to reach an agreement with the leading political figures of the 
country to the effect that the Italo-Ethiopian Convention of May 16, 1908, should be 
taken as a basis for negotiation.32 They implicitly acknowledged the validity of the 
Treaty. But unfortunately, the Italy of the 1950s had not yet atoned for its atrocities to   
come to terms with its past guilt. Italian policy even during the Trusteeship period still 
encouraged Somali irredentism against Ethiopia and was bent on instigating and 
exploiting Christian and Muslim antagonism to its advantage.33 When the negotiations 
failed, both Ethiopia and Italy reported to the United Nations. Italy proposed mediation, 
while Ethiopia favoured arbitration. The General Assembly approved the latter 
procedure, and a tribunal was formed in 1958.34 However, they were unable to agree on 
an independent person to assist in framing the necessary terms of reference. In 1960, 
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Somalia became independent and inherited the problem. What exists today is the 
Provisional Administrative Line formed by the Ethiopians and the British in 1950.35  
 
The Creation of the Somali Republic:  
The Somali Republic was created in 1960 with the merging of former British 
Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. Since then, Somalia had made it its avowed national 
policy to unite all the lands wherever Somalis live in order to establish what is called 
“Greater Somalia.” In point of fact, article IV (4) of its constitution states: “The Somali 
Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means, the union of all Somali territories.”  
To that end, the national flag and emblem is a five pointed star – the five points 
representing Djibouti, the North-Western Province of Kenya, the Ogaden Province of 
Ethiopia, and the two territories which had already united to form Somalia.36  
The term “Greater Somalia” which became a rallying cry for Somali politicians, 
first came into use in the 1930s by Italian colonial officials, to describe their dream that 
the Italian colony of Somaliland – enlarged to include a part of Ethiopia - would be 
prosperous and   provide a home for Italian immigrants. A decade and half later, the 
British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, also referred to “Greater Somalia” in proposing 
the Bevin Plan for post-World War II Somalia.  He outlined a plan calling for a British-
supervised Trusteeship over the Somali-inhabited areas of British and Italian Somaliland- 
then under the British Military Administration, and,  suggested, if Ethiopia would be 
willing, to include the Ogden Province. Bevin’s proposal was presented in 1946 to the 
Council of Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers during the deliberations on the 
disposition of the former Italian colonies. The self-serving plan was withdrawn when the 
USA and the Soviet Union accused Britain of seeking its own aggrandizement at the 
expense of Ethiopia.  
Does “Greater Somalia” have any acceptance in the Horn of Africa outside of 
Somalia?  The Republic of Djibouti, for example, is inhabited by the Afars and Issas.  
The Afars could not be expected to identify themselves with Somali nationalism. In fact, 
former Djibouti Prime Minister, Ali Aref Bourhan, was speaking for many Afars when he 
said that “the malicious and totally unwelcome aspirations of the Somali Republic are not 
acceptable to us, and we are ready to resist any attempt at annexation, and any move 
against our independent nationhood in the future. The territory belonged to the Afar 
people from time immemorial. The Somalis came here to work only when the town of 
Djibouti was founded in the late 19th century, and after the Franco-Ethiopian railway was 
built.”  37 What about the Issas? Since their Zeila Congress of 1960, the Issas have been 
dreaming of establishing an Issa state, composed of southern Djibouti, the Dire Dawa and 
Gurgura provinces of Ethiopia, and the Issa Province of Somaliland.38  
The Kenyans find Somalia’s claim to Jubaland uncanny and offensive.39 It should 
be noted that to compensate Italy for changing alliances in WWI, an area the size of 
Belgium that included the Port of Kismayou was taken away from Kenya by Britain and 
added to Italian Somaliland.40 When the Government of Somalia made its views known 
in the early 1960s about the North-Western Province of Kenya, and claimed that Kenya 
was unlawfully exercising sovereignty over Somali territory to which it was not entitled, 
Kenya considered it as adding insult to injury. Nairobi was quick to point out that   
“Britain went as far as giving a large eastern part of Kenya, known as Jubaland [including 
the Port of Kismayou] to Somalia in 1924. If every territory to which people of the 
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Somali tribe migrate and graze their livestock is to become part and parcel of the 
Republic of Somalia, in accordance to Pan-Somalism and the policy of creating “Greater 
Somalia”, then the concept of territorial integrity of any other state becomes meaningless. 
If they do not want to live with us in Kenya, they can pack their camels and go back to 
Somalia.”41  
Despite such reactions, however,  Mogadisho continued in being enmeshed in its 
dreams of territorial aggrandizement in pursuance of “Greater Somalia.”  Perhaps, the 
truth lies in what some acute observers of the scene had detected. Some of the Somali 
politicians encouraged militant irredentism on behalf of creating a “Greater Somalia,” 
merely   to divert attention from internal problems. Some did so, in order to win election 
votes. But there were other politicians also who seriously believed in it.42 
Nevertheless, the unresolved question of the Ethiopian –Somalia border provided 
the Somali politicians with some ground on which to challenge Addis Ababa’s control 
over the Ogaden.43  In fact, less than six months after Somalia’s independence, there were 
military clashes with Ethiopia, the outcome of which was not favourable to Mogadisho.44 
Similarly, when fighting in the Ogaden erupted into full-scale war in February 1964, the 
Somali army was soundly defeated. Some of the Ethiopian generals like the popular 
General Amman M.Andom had requested permission to cross the border and March all 
the way to Mogadisho in order “to teach Somalia a lesson that it would not forget.” 45  
The request was flatly rejected by Haile Selassie. 
However, Somalia was not restrained. It continued to do its very best to foment 
instability in order   to take advantage of Ethiopia’s domestic woes, with a view to 
advance its own interests.46 It was   soon discovered that Somalia alone was no match for 
Ethiopia.  If ever it were to “liberate” the Ogaden, it would have to find allies for itself. 
One way of going about it was to invoke the principle of self-determination. When there 
seemed no progress in that sphere, Somali    politicians started to express solidarity with 
the Arabs and joined the Arab League, even if the people of Somalia are not Arabs and 
do not even consider themselves to be so. The Northern Frontier District Liberation Front 
which aimed at independence   for the 200,000 Somalis living in Kenya was created.  The 
leaders even toured Arab capitals in quest of financial support. When being “Arab” had 
no political or financial dividend, Somalia became “Marxist”, not because of the 
objective conditions of the country, but for the sole purpose of acquiring arms from the 
USSR. In fact, as Tom Farer acidly, but accurately put it: “Even a careful search 
conducted by the late Sherlock Holmes- the master of detectives-  would fail to unearth 
either a recognizable proletariat or any economic height to be dominated in Somalia. 
Most of the classic Marxist and socialist ideas have little relevance to the actual 
circumstances of the country.”47  And to cap the absurdity, when its “Marxism” failed to 
advance its territorial ambitions, Mogadisho’s politicians were willing to abandon 
Marxism, put on a three-piece suit, and preach the virtues of capitalism and private 
enterprise to gain the support of the west.  
  On the other hand, its adversary - Ethiopia - given its huge population - did go 
for self-reliance and built an army of 200, 000. It signed a military alliance with Kenya in 
1963 – an alliance that   was   directed   against the “common” enemy - Somalia. It was 
reaffirmed in 1979. Moreover, Ethiopia   put to good use Addis Ababa’s position as a 
centre of Pan African unity and consistently invoked one of the sacrosanct and cardinal 
principles of the OAU – “the inviolability of state frontiers.” It could neutralize 
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provocative neighbours like the Sudan, by reminding them of their own secessionist 
problems. Ethiopia could also appropriate the tactics of its Mogadisho adversary and 
foster “liberation fronts”, and when the regime was pushed by its own leftist, Stalinist, 
Maoist, and Marxist rivals assembled in the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement, and the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party, it could out wit and out left them, by developing 
a strong alliance with the first socialist state in the world - the Soviet Union.  Another 
factor which influenced the decision of the military regime in Ethiopia to move in that 
direction was the knowledge that, unlike Washington, Moscow would   use all its military 
resources to meet its commitments to client states.  
                             Arming the Horn of Africa: 
Ever since 1945, when the Emperor Haile Selassie met President Franklin 
Roosevelt, Ethiopia had been making a conscious effort to extricate itself from the undue 
influence of the dominant European powers, whose historical   treachery it knew only too 
well, and to get closer to the USA – a country whose geographic distance, and history of 
anti-colonialism that Ethiopia’s leaders found most attractive. Subsequently, the USA 
began to replace the traditional European powers and became Ethiopia’s important arms 
supplier. The emergence of the United States as the dominant western power in the post-
World War II era further facilitated this process.  
Somalia at first turned to the western powers for military aid. But it discovered 
that they did not want to flout the basic OAU principle of respect for existing boundaries. 
Furthermore, they   were not also willing to arm it to fight Ethiopia- a country that was 
the principal ally of the United States in the region. Although Somalia turned to the 
Soviet Union, both Washington and Moscow preferred to be entrenched in Ethiopia.48  
Ethiopia was the strategic prize to be won. Its climate, physical size and population, 
history, its development potential in every sector, and central position in Africa, were all 
very attractive. It was claimed that alliance with Ethiopia would   provide a great power 
with some tempting opportunities for internal political and economic cooperation, as well 
as for a regional power base. Whereas an alliance with Somalia was   of interest primarily 
for geo-strategic reasons. It brought as many burdens as advantages. The Russians were 
equally attracted to Ethiopia for the same reasons as the Americans, with an even older 
historic interest going back to the days of Peter the Great (1672- 1725). 49 It was a while, 
though, before their   wish was to be realized.  Mogadisho turned to the Soviet Union, 
and signed a series of agreements with Moscow. 50 As noted earlier, the Soviets were 
biding their time in Somalia until they could lever the Americans out of Ethiopia. In fact, 
they were simply waiting for Haile Selassie’s demise. 51  
Over the past four decades, therefore, both the USA and the USSR played great-
power arms patrons owing to their capability and willingness to provide vast quantities of 
sophisticated military hardware of all types. Yet, the local actors were also constantly 
diverting scarce resources from programmes that were designed to help improve the 
living conditions of the people. This can be illustrated from the fact that military 
spending over a decade and half (1967-1984) typically accounted between one-fourth and 
as much as one third of Ethiopia’s military spending. Mogadisho’s defence expenditures 
were approximately of the same magnitude, ranging between 13.3% and 27.5% of the 
national budget during the period.52 
 From 1953-1977, the United States provided Ethiopia with over $185 million 
worth of grant military assistance. 53 However, the Soviet Union was able to demonstrate 
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a determination to arm its Somali client in every major weapons category more 
effectively than the USA had done for Ethiopia. 54 Although Moscow was arming 
Somalia to the teeth, on the military balance sheet, the Soviets thought that Somalia 
would lose a war against its bigger and stronger neighbour. Yet, arming Somalia might be 
used as leverage to force Ethiopia to distance itself from the United States. 55  In fact, in 
1964, Soviet officials had reportedly offered Haile Selassie anything he wanted, 
including as many military weapons as Ethiopia desired, if he kicked out the Americans. 
56
 But Haile Selassie would have none of that.  
From 1967-1976 Mogadisho imported $185 million worth of arms, of which $181 
million arrived from the USSR. 57 Thanks to the Soviets, Somalia began to enjoy sizeable 
margins of superiority over Ethiopia in combat aircraft, tanks and armoured personnel 
carriers. And as might be expected, it started to foment instability in Ethiopia and gamble 
at a calculated chaos, in order to advance its own interests. In fact, in 1972,   a small 
probing force of Somali soldiers had crossed into the Ogaden near the area where an 
American company had discovered oil and natural gas deposits. 58     
Even in Haile Selassie’s days, Washington remained unwilling to commit itself 
fully to Ethiopia. Despite Addis Ababa’s perception of high-level threats to Ethiopia’s 
security and territorial integrity, and perpetual sense of encirclement by hostile forces, the 
United States did not provide the weapons that the regime needed so badly. The strategic 
superiority of the Somali Army that had very much worried the Ethiopian authorities was 
dismissed by the State Department as a “myth”.59  Instead, Washington recommended 
basic reforms.  The Kennedy Administration, in particular, insisted that Haile Selassie’s 
government carry out basic reforms in the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of 
government. It recommended land reform, local government to the provinces, more 
power to parliament, expansion of educational facilities, a liberal investment law that 
would attract private investment, more freedom to the press, and so on, to which the 
Haile Selassie government lent deaf ears. 
 However, to keep western aid flowing, Haile Selassie put on a face of reform 
while underneath, the Ethiopian state remained unchanged.60   Haile Selassie’s 1973 
appeal to Nixon not to abandon Ethiopia in its hour of need therefore fell on deaf ears. 
The other reason why the Americans did not want to provide arms to Ethiopia was that 
they had a world-wide communications centre outside Asmara called, Kagnew Station. It 
beamed intelligence to the Pentagon. Since satellites appeared on the scene in the early 
1970s, Kagnew had already outlived its usefulness to Washington. 
 No doubt, the regime was disappointed and disillusioned with the Americans. 
Haile Selassie’s government wanted only   more arms with which it could keep itself in 
power. It never realized that carrying out those reforms would have provided it 
legitimacy and served as pillars of its strength. In the end, it was as President Kennedy 
aptly put it: “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent 
revolution inevitable.” The Ethiopian Revolution which erupted in 1974, swept aside 
Haile Selassie’s government and ushered in a reign of terror, blood shed, mass 
displacement, and destruction of property, which could have been avoided had Haile 
Selassie’s regime taken timely reforms.  
As far as weapons were concerned, the military government which came to power 
in 1974 shared the established perception about Washington. The leaders   also strongly 
believed that the USA would never be sympathetic to the socialist system the new regime 
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wanted to build.  Once they correctly perceived the Somali threat, they started looking in 
the direction of Moscow. The Soviet Union was only too eager and too happy to embrace 
them. Washington was not comfortable with the new regime, especially with its policy of 
nationalization of private property, the summary executions of political prisoners, the 
gross violations of human rights, and a foreign policy that the Americans considered 
reckless. USA-Ethiopian relations, therefore, went from bad to worse, to the extent that 
Washington was not even willing to release weapons for which Addis Ababa had already 
paid. It appears that there was also considerable pressure from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran 
and Egypt, which influenced the decision. To be sure, the best policy path for 
Washington lay in mending old fences with Addis Ababa. But given the Vietnam 
syndrome, it was suffering from what was called “cognitive dissonance” and “self-
induced paralysis.” In effect, neither Ethiopia nor the USA exhibited much interest in 
salvaging a relationship that had been allowed to atrophy.61 
 Fortunately for Somalia, a bonanza was coming.   From 1975-1978 ten of 
Ethiopia’s fourteen provinces were in rebellion against the policies of the radical leftist 
regime that had overthrown Haile Selassie’s government.  The revolutionary upheavals 
going on in Ethiopia appeared to offer a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.  Somalia, 
therefore, exploited Ethiopia’s momentary weaknesses and seized the Ogaden. It did so, 
according to Ethiopian government sources, by deploying (1977-1978) some 100,000 
soldiers who were fully equipped with up- to- date Soviet weapons and attacked Ethiopia. 
As a result, thousands of innocent people were killed, and thousands were made homeless 
and destitute.  Development projects in eastern and southern Ethiopia worth millions of 
dollars were destroyed. Schools, hospitals, bridges, farms, power plants, water supply 
systems, industrial plants, and even United Nations financed settlement projects for 
nomads were not spared. Whole villages and towns were razed to the ground.62 
Addis Ababa had consistently claimed that not one inch of Ethiopian territory 
would ever be relinquished. Yet, when Somalia succeeded in occupying the Ogaden, the 
national humiliation was deeply felt by all Ethiopians. After all, fighting and dying for 
the state has always been a compelling occupation of Ethiopians. Even if it was not 
always done with the greatest technological sophistication, nevertheless, Ethiopian army 
units have always been distinguished by a high ability to suffer casualties and a low rate 
of surrender. 63    
A detailed examination as to why the super-powers exchanged partners in the 
Horn as dispensable toys is beyond the scope of this study. It needs to be said, however, 
that in exchanging partners, they were quite adept and did not even have the slightest 
compunction or scruple.64 By 1976-1977, the honeymoon between Moscow and 
Mogadisho was over. Since better prospects were available in Ethiopia, the Soviet Union 
had no hesitation in switching its alliance from Somalia to Ethiopia.65 The USA, too, 
switched to Somalia. 66 Given the recent defections of Egypt and the Sudan from the 
USSR to the West, Ethiopia might be a more dependable client to the Soviet Union. 
While Somali forces continued their successful offensive in the Ogaden, the USSR 
mounted a massive military airlift to Ethiopia in November 1977. By March 1978, the 
Soviet Union had delivered to Ethiopia military equipment of an estimated value in 
excess of $1 billion, roughly four or five times the value of all U.S aid delivered to 
Ethiopia since 1953. 67  But shifting from one system of military technology to another 
has never been easy.  Nevertheless, along with the East Germans and the Cubans, the 
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Soviets   began to train the Ethiopian armed forces in the use of the new military 
technology. And the Somalis never gave Ethiopia much time to absorb it. Nevertheless, 
with the help of the socialist countries, a formidable fighting machine was created which 
became equal to the task waiting for it. 
 It would be hard to believe that Somalia was encouraged by Moscow to attack 
Ethiopia. But it would also be equally difficult to believe that the Soviets, who so lavishly 
and so generously armed Somalia, were not unaware against whom all the arms build up 
was directed. Besides, they had no interest in restraining Somalia’s skirmishes, even if at 
low level, as long as Ethiopia was an American ally.   In any event, Addis Ababa gave 
priority to the diplomatic struggle. Having gained the support of the OAU, the diplomatic 
offense was taken to the United Nations, where Ethiopia declared that “the root cause of 
the conflict was the expansionist ambition of successive Somali regimes – an ambition 
that is based on an untenable and absurd assumption - that any land on which ethnic 
Somalis live, must be part and parcel of the Somali Republic.” 68 The Somalis, in turn, 
answered by arguing that “the root cause of the conflict was Ethiopian colonialism, and 
the solution to the problem lies, in allowing the people of the Ogaden to exercise their 
right to self-determination.”69 
 
But diplomacy alone, no matter how skillful, unless backed by military strength, 
has no leverage,  and does not give clout. When Ethiopia’s counter-offensive began, the 
Somalis first lost air control. Somalia’s MIGs were no match for the American F-5s - still 
used by the Ethiopian Air Force. Within days, the Somali Air Force was put out of 
commission.  By March 1978, some 40,000 regular Ethiopian troops and 80,000 
members of the People’s Militia mounted a counter offensive and were repelling the 
occupying Somali forces. 70 In the process, Somalia’s 6,000 elite force was crushed at 
Jijiga. The strategic reserve of 2,000 soldiers was let   loose, only to be devastated a few 
kilometers inside the Ethiopian border. Somalia also lost its tanks, armoured personnel 
carriers, and tons of military equipment, and suffered an estimated casualty of 100,000.71 
Without doubt, Somalia was decisively defeated. Mogadisho had miscalculated very 
badly, and it was not for the first time. This time, too, some Ethiopian military strategists 
recommended the invasion and occupation of Somalia. However, after a lengthy debate, 
the government decided otherwise.72  
While Somalia was given a free hand to destroy Ethiopia, it was ironic that   the 
victim of aggression was denied the right of hot-pursuit that is permitted by international 
law – the right to go after the enemy and   destroy his war making capacity. There were 
warning   signs   from the governments of the USA, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, who 
were prepared to intervene militarily if Ethiopia had crossed the border. Washington’s 
main concern was to ensure that the Somali Army was not completely destroyed. 73 
Perhaps speaking for the many who are fair-minded the world over and reflective of the 
fact that Kenya had its own boundary dispute with Somalia, Nairobi’s Daily Nation 
wrote: “Now that the tide has turned, the world is being fed by a hysterical claptrap about 
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. The time has come for Somalia to swallow its medicine. 
Whipping up religious sentiments by linking strategic issues to Islam in order to widen 
the conflict by drawing other nations to the conflict, is no solution.  The only way in 
which Somalia can call off the Ethiopians is to renounce its territorial claims.”74    
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Mogadisho had even denied its involvement in the fighting. It claimed that the 
“Western Somali Liberation Front” was doing all the fighting. In actual fact, the so-called 
liberation front was the Somali army in another name. However, when the moment of 
truth arrived, white gloves could not hide blood-stained hands. The convenient fiction of 
non-involvement was dropped, and Siad Barre himself declared to the world that “as of 
March 15, 1978, Somalia has withdrawn its armed forces from the Ogaden.” 75 
 As an expression of Arab and Muslim solidarity, Saudi Arabia gave financial aid 
to Somalia. Iraq, Syria and the Sudan provided military aid. Egypt gave   millions of 
dollars worth of Soviet weapons. In fact, Sadat was quoted as saying that in addition to 
sending arms, Egypt might send troops to help Somalia. It   was at that   time that 
Egyptian planes which were transporting weapons to Somalia were forcefully landed at 
Nairobi airport by the Kenyan Air Force. 76 To be fair, it should be stated that not all 
Arab countries were for Somalia. On the contrary, such countries as Algeria, Libya and 
the People’s Republic of Yemen supported Ethiopia. 
After the USSR switched its alliance to Ethiopia, the USA started arming 
Somalia. Between 1979 and 1983, Somalia imported $580 million worth of arms, of 
which $30 million came from the USA. Over seven years (1980-1987), however, the 
USA committed almost $500 million worth of military resources to Mogadisho – more 
than $100 million above what the USA has supplied to Ethiopia during the course of their 
twenty five years arms partnership. 77 
 But Ethiopia’s military successes of 1978 did not bring the Ethio-Somali 
conflicts to an end.78 A year after the Ogaden war ended, an estimated 10,000-30, 000 
Somali insurgents were involved in harassment operations against Ethiopian forces.79 As 
a result, Addis Ababa had to devise a means by which Somalia could either be checked, 
or reduced to its size, or be devoured by its own contradictions.  To that end, Ethiopia 
appropriated Somalia’s own tactics and began to foster “liberation fronts.” Addis Ababa 
encouraged the establishment of the Mejertein-based   Somali Salvation Democratic 
Front that was led by Abdullahi Yussef. 80 It also started to establish very close relations 
with another dissident movement, the   Somali National Movement, (SNM) – an Issaque- 
based clan group founded in London in 1979, which moved its headquarters to Ethiopia 
in June 1982.81 At the end of 1986, SNM launched a military campaign in the north of 
Somalia that resulted in the fighting between the military forces of Somalia and Ethiopia 
in 1987.  A year later, the SNM launched a new offensive. The military response ordered 
by Barre was simply brutal and barbaric. As many as 10,000 innocent Somalis were 
slaughtered. 82  Moreover, in order to give Somalia a dose of its own medicine, a 
mechanized unit of some 9,000 Ethiopian troops crossed over into Somalia to support the 
operations of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and helped to bring under 
the control of SSDF- two Somali towns – Galdogob and Balanballo, north of 
Mogadisho.83   
Finally, after his army’s defeat in a series of skirmishes, Barre destroyed Hargeisa 
in 1988 with 50,000 deaths.  When Issaque, Dulbehante and Gadabursi pilots refused to 
bomb their own people, the Somali government hired ex-Rhodesian Air Force pilots 
flying British Hawker Hunter aircraft to carry out bombing missions over Hargeisa. 
Indiscriminate killings and severe government repression of innocent   people resulted in 
the slaughter of thousands of northerners and in the immigration of some 110,000 
refugees to Ethiopia.84 With Somalia’s defeat, each of the sixty Somali clans reaffirmed 
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their sovereignty, and were ready to return to their previous forms of governance.85  All 
this was to precipitate the declaration of independence of the Republic of Somaliland, the 
emergence of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, and the complete 
disintegration of Somalia, whose breakup actually started with its defeat by Ethiopia in 
1978. Let us then summarize the conflicting positions of Ethiopia and Somalia – 
positions that have negatively affected their relations for over forty years. 
Ethiopia’s Position: 
 Ethiopia argues that its dispute with Somalia centres on Mogadisho’s unwillingness to 
negotiate the demarcation of the borders of former Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. The 
northern portion, (i.e. the Ethiopia-British Somaliland border) it says, has already been 
demarcated, and therefore, cannot be a subject for discussion, let alone negotiation.   In 
point of fact, Ethiopia maintains that its borders with Somalia are internationally 
recognized, and have been confirmed on nine different occasions from 1897 to 1981.  
1. On July 28, 1897, when the Anglo-Ethiopian boundary treaty was   
affirmed by the British Parliament and duly ratified by Queen Victoria;                    
2. On June 16, 1908, when the Italian Parliament ratified the Italo-    
Ethiopian boundary treaty of 1897 and the Convention of 1908. Duly     
concluded, signed and ratified, it legally binds the signatory parties and    
their successors, either directly or by right of devolution;   
3. By the very fact of Ethiopia’s membership to the League of Nations in  
1923, and when the League of Nations registered these treaties (art.1, 
para.3 and art.18);   
4. In 1934, when the members of the League of Nations accepted the 1908   
   Convention as the legal basis for solving the Italo-Ethiopian boundary    
dispute, and when Ethiopia went to war with Fascist Italy (1934-1941) 
in the defence of the very same province now claimed by Somalia;  
      5. In 1945, when the U.N. registered these treaties; 
    6. In 1950, when the U.N. General Assembly approved the Trusteeship  
Agreement of 2 December 1950, affirming that Somalia’s boundaries 
with Ethiopia shall be those fixed by international agreements. And in so 
far as they are not delimited, they shall be delimited in accordance with 
a procedure approved by the General Assembly;  
      7. In July 1964, when the OAU Heads of State Summit in Cairo adopted the    
Resolution (AHG/Res.16 (I) on the inviolability of state frontiers; 
  8. In 1964, when the Non-Aligned Heads of State Summit in its meeting in Cairo    
decided that existing frontiers should be maintained; 
      9. In 1981, when the OAU Heads of State Summit in Nairobi adopted the                  
                Recommendations of the 1980 Logos meeting of the Good Offices Committee,     
and declared that “the Ogaden is an integral part of Ethiopia”.86 
                Somalia’s Position: 
  For the Somali Republic, the dispute with Ethiopia has nothing to do with      
    problems associated with border demarcation. Rather, it is a question of    
    respecting the rights of the people of the Ogaden to self-determination, and of    
recovering land, which Somalia claims, that it “lost” because of the 19th century 
treaties that Ethiopia signed with the various European colonial powers.  
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1. Somalia contends that both the U.N and OAU Charters affirm the rights of  
peoples to self-determination, and that Article 103 of the U.N.Charter on self- 
determination prevails over rights which Ethiopia claims under treaties that it signed 
with the various European colonial powers; 
2. Somalia accuses Ethiopia of being a colonialist state, and argues that the    
    people of the Ogaden are under alien domination. They must therefore be   
    beneficiary to all the relevant resolutions on de-colonization in order to be able   
to exercise their rights to self-determination;  
3. Somalia says that it was never a party to these treaties, and as such, it should 
not be expected to accept them; 
4. That such resolutions adopted by the OAU and   the Non-Aligned countries 
refer to new disputes, and not to those which already exist; and 
5. That Somalia has registered its serious reservations to such resolutions and   
therefore is not bound by them.87  
The Ethiopians have countered the argument by claiming that, to begin with, a state 
has to have defined boundaries. Since there was no state in history called “Somalia” 
before 1960, they could not have taken land from a non-existent entity.  Ethiopia has also 
referred to Article 62 (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
provides that “A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to 
those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which are not foreseen by the 
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty, if 
the Treaty establishes a boundary.” 88 
 Addis Ababa has also referred to the International Law Commission’s Report that 
was approved by the U.N. General Assembly, which maintains, “that the clean state 
principle does not in any event relieve a newly independent state of the obligation to 
respect a boundary settlement and certain other situations of a territorial character 
established by Treaty.” 
  For Ethiopia, the right of self-determination cannot have preponderance over the 
principle of sovereignty, and it emphasizes that Ethiopian Somalis, who live in the 
Ogaden Province, enjoy the right to govern themselves, to establish their own regional 
constitution, to elect their own representatives to regional and federal assemblies, and to 
use their language as a medium of instruction in schools, and in that way exercise the 
right to self-determination. As if the border or territorial dispute between the two 
countries was not enough, Islamic fundamentalism has now emerged as the new 
destabilizing force. 
Islamic Fundamentalism and the Horn of Africa:  
 At one time, the presence of the USSR in Northeast Africa served as a stabilizing 
function by making sure that local conflicts did not spill over into direct confrontation 
with the USA. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, it may be deduced 
that Northeast Africa and the Middle East have now been transformed into areas of overt 
and exclusive U.S domains. But such preponderance is likely to remain quite superficial 
and even brittle, largely because there are no underlying bonds of shared values and 
political culture between the USA and the Arab/Muslim world. American influence in the 
region is largely limited to regimes like the one in Saudi Arabia, that have no significant 
influence even on their own populations, and which can be overthrown at any time. In 
fact, Arab and Muslim hostility to the USA will increase if there is no substantial 
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improvement in the social and economic well being of the peoples of the region, and if 
Washington fails to deliver in helping to resolve the Arab-Israeli disputes. 
The gross national product (GDP) of 260 million Arabs is less than that of 40 
million Spaniards. And even if the production of the 67 million Iranians is included with 
that of the Arabs, the total is still only two-thirds of that of Italy. They generate barely 
1% of the world’s non-oil exports. Barley one person out of a hundred has access to a 
computer, and while 65 million Arabs are illiterate, the rate of illiteracy for women is 
more than 50%.89 It should also be noted that 70% of the current Arab population has 
been born since 1970 with no memory of previous Arab-Israeli wars, that twenty two 
Arab states have a declining gross national product, and that the total exports of the 
twenty two Arab countries, excluding oil, is not even equal to the exports of Norway. At 
the current growth rate of 3.2%, in the next 20 years, the population of many Arab 
countries could double.  These states would be ungovernable through secular ideologies. 
Internal repression of minorities like the Christians, Jews, Kurds and Berbers, or 
mobilization of religious fanaticism and nationalist radicalism against the USA and 
Israel, or against Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, could become the wave of the future. 
The Coptic Christians of Egypt, whose church dates back centuries before the Arab and 
Muslim conquest of Egypt, are a case in point. Because of their refusal to accept Islam, 
they are hated, persecuted, and despised by Islamists. Speaking in general terms, 
therefore, since the existing regimes cannot provide social services and basic security to 
the unemployed, the frustrated, and the marginalized, puritanical Islam of virulent and 
fiery mullahs- of Hamas, Hizbullah, the Muslim Brothers, and Al-Qaeda - is on the rise. 
In the process, while making minorities in their midst convenient scapegoats and outlets 
for their frustrations, these Muslim fundamentalists are also busy undermining the 
influence of the U.S in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, hoping to fill the void left by 
the Soviet Union.  
Islamic fundamentalism thrives in areas of poverty and destitution.  It has already 
begun its creeping inroads into the Horn of Africa and has established tentacles 
throughout the sub-region.  According to the New York Times, “Fears are mounting 
again among Christians in Ethiopia about another onslaught from Muslim 
Fundamentalists. The new government led by Meles Zenawi is not only unsympathetic to 
the Church but is more accommodating to Islamic Fundamentalism, Ethiopian officials 
and diplomats say.”90 Eritrea has been repeatedly invaded from the Sudan. In 1996, a 
series of bomb blasts rocked hotels in Addis Ababa and in the eastern Ethiopian town of 
Dire Dawa. Al-Itihad al-Islami, that is based in Somalia, and that has links with al-Qaeda, 
has been blamed for it. There was also an attempted assassination of President Mubarek 
of Egypt on June 26, 1995, in Ethiopia. In January 2002, five Somalis who belonged to 
the Al-Itihad al-Islamiya were sentenced to death by an Ethiopian court for carrying out a 
series of bomb attacks in the country. These terrorist activities have continued. The 
followers of Osama bin Laden continue to use Somalia as a base for carrying out terrorist 
activities in the Horn of Africa. 
Over the last couple of years, violent anti-government campaigns in many Middle 
Eastern countries, including the subversive activities of the hard-line Islamic regime in 
the Sudan, have been having stirrings in the Horn of Africa that presage its emergence as 
the new battleground for Islamic fundamentalism. To that end, such fundamentalist 
organizations as the Mujahedeen of Islamic Jihad of Eritrea, the Islamic Jihad for the 
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liberation of Ethiopia, the Muslim Brotherhood Wahadiya in Somalia, and the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front, have all been organized with the active support of the 
Sudanese regime, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Osama Bin Laden.91 In fact, Islamist experts 
had already trained, organized, and equipped some 15,000 Somalis in camps and were 
ready to lead them into combat.92 Some of the groups have recruited experienced 
preachers and fighters from Mujahedeen and Muslim Brotherhood organizations in 
Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan and Saudi Arabia to press their agenda 
around the Horn. The source of most of the financial support for the radical groups, as 
well as the weapons, has been traced to Saudi Arabia, which promotes Wahabism - a 
particular sect of Islam that espouses violence and terrorism. The Sudan and Iran lend 
support, but cannot match even private Saudi financial resources.93   
The ultimate purpose of all this is the establishment in the Horn of Africa of the 
type of regimes that are found in the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and until very recently, 
Afghanistan. The objective was, and still is, to control the vital maritime passage way                                                                                                                       
of the Red Sea,  to alter the demographic and religious composition of the sub-region, 
and ultimately to establish Muslim states of their liking – states where Koranic Sharia 
laws will be imposed, where women will be treated like third- class citizens, and where 
people will be punished in accordance with hudud, which provides for amputation of 
limbs for a crime, and the stoning to death for such offences as adultery. Those who 
convert from Islam to another religion, including Christianity, can be put to death, as has 
been the case in several Middle East countries. But why are not religious minorities in the 
Middle East, including Christians, allowed to enjoy the same freedom of religion as 
Muslims do? No less a person than Hassan Abdullah Turabi, the chief Islamist ideologue 
in Khartoum, has said: Ethiopia will be destroyed, thus paving the way for the 
establishment of a chain of Islamic polities extending from the Sudan to the Indian 
Ocean.94  It should be recalled that it was the same Islamists from the Sudan who invaded 
Ethiopia in 1888, and among other things, burned 40 out of 47 churches of the city of 
Gondar, and took 3, 445 Ethiopians as slaves to Khartoum. 95   
  Ethiopia is basically a tolerant country. Unlike many in the Middle East, it is 
also a secular state. Nevertheless, the very same secularism, which is a central tenet of the 
Ethiopian state and which keeps the religious balance, is being threatened. The country is 
being forced to navigate between those who are struggling for democracy, religious 
equality, peace, and development, and those fundamentalists and religious extremists 
who want to impose Islam through terror and manslaughter. One would have hoped that 
the regime in power would be even handed and protect the country, but without doubt, it 
is overly Islamic. While it claims to be struggling against the followers of Osama Ben 
Laden and Al-Queda in Somalia, at the same time, it has opened Ethiopia’s doors to 
Wahabists from Saudi Arabia, and the Muslim Brothers from Egypt, Libya, Sudan and 
other countries.  For the first time in Ethiopia’s history, one can see the striking increase 
in the number of Muslim women who are now wearing Islamic niqab - the veil that 
covers everything but the eyes, and hijab- the veil that wraps tight under the chin.   The 
number of new mosques built in Ethiopia has also increased by 120% in the last fifteen 
years.  Several churches have been burned, and Christians have been slaughtered in 
several provinces by the same fundamentalists and religious extremists.   In contrast, 
Christian missionaries cannot preach, let alone build churches in many Middle East 
countries. Why is not there reciprocal toleration between Christianity and Islam? 
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The chaos in Somalia, fractured as it is along clan and tribal lines, and immersed 
in inter-clan struggle for power, has made segments of the population and their power-
hungry leaders amenable to close cooperation with the fundamentalist leaders of the 
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan, as well as Osama Bin Laden.  In spite of the 
existence of a Transitional Government that has been recognized by the African Union 
and the United Nations, the Union of Islamic Courts who harbour al-Qaeda members, and 
who are being bank rolled by Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, want to establish a 
fundamentalist Muslim theocracy and to turn Somalia into a safe haven to foreign 
terrorists.  The Islamists also want to unite Somalia, but Somaliland and Puntland are 
resisting them. Furthermore, Somalia’s Islamic leaders want the Northern Frontier 
District of Kenya and the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia to be part of Somalia.  
To help them achieve their objectives, the Islamic leaders of Somalia have been 
soliciting aid and support from their co-religionists in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Yemen, Syria, Iran, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, the U.A.E., 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and the USA are all involved in the conflict one way or the 
other. Ethiopia and Kenya which support the Transitional Government have legitimate 
reasons for taking more than a casual interest in what is going on in Somalia. Ethiopia 
opposes the Wahabist Islamists because they are terrorists and expansionists. As a result, 
they have declared “jihad” on Ethiopia. Addis Ababa dismisses the call for Jihad as 
“foolish” and “cheap” propaganda.  Despite denials, some of these counties were 
providing weapons to the Islamists as well as to the Transitional Government. 
Calls for a Federation or Confederation of the Horn:  
Several political leaders of the countries of the Horn of Africa and many scholars 
who have studied the sub-region had, in the past, recommended some sort of a federation 
or confederation between Ethiopia and Somalia. They believe that federation would end 
the tension on the frontiers and remove the danger of national chauvinism on both sides 
of the border. They also argue that common resources of the two countries can be pooled 
and their products exchanged. The Emperor Haile Selassie was among the first to 
describe the sub-region as a natural economic unit.96  In fact, as early as 1957 he 
proposed a federation between Ethiopia and Somalia.  A year later, he requested the USA 
to support an association of Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. 97   Moreover, as early as 1961, 
when asked about the possibilities of a federation of the Horn of Africa, President Aden 
Abdullah Osman of Somalia had the following to say:  “If the Ogaden were made 
available to us [Somalia], we would gladly join Ethiopia in a federation. If the Ethiopians 
were interested, I would be prepared to undertake it.”98 
A decade later, as soon as the military government came to power in Ethiopia, it 
made the following policy declaration: “Ethiopia is linked with the Sudan, Somalia, and 
Kenya by common cultural, ethnic, and economic factors. It will broaden these ties and in 
order to induce the cooperation of these countries, it has decided to take concrete steps 
periodically in this direction.”99 In the same spirit, President Fidel Castro of Cuba had 
chaired a meeting in Aden in 1977, in which the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia 
participated, and where he proposed a federation between Ethiopia, Somalia, and South 
Yemen - a proposal that the Soviet Union fully backed, but which failed to materialize 
because of the unfavourable internal and external conditions.100 Barre arrogantly walked 
out of the meeting, convinced that because he had the weapons, he would bring a military 
solution to the problem.   
 18 
Several scholars have interpreted the conflict as a clash between nation and state. 
While the multi-national Ethiopian state wants its boundaries to be respected, Somalia 
wants the nation and the state to coincide. Yet, the two concepts of state and nation need 
not   necessarily clash. They could exist without any need to be coincidental, as is the 
case with Britain, France, Switzerland and Belgium.   For scholars like Tom Farer, the 
political sub-divisions of the Horn of Africa are potentially symbiotic. Development in 
the hinterland could foster prosperity in the Indian Ocean as well as the Red Sea ports. If 
large oil and gas reserves rest under the soil of the Ogaden, the most economic path for 
export purposes would be to the sea through Somalia. Neither the Somalis nor the 
Ethiopians can rationalize their meat packing operations without cooperative pricing 
policies designed to assure a predictable flow of animals to slaughter-houses. Realization 
of the full agricultural potential of the land adjacent to the Juba and the Wabi Shibelle 
rivers, the only cultivable area in Somalia, requires an inter-state agreement between 
Ethiopia and Somalia, because the rivers rise in Ethiopia. Ameliorating the tortured 
existence of the nomads in Eastern Ethiopia and Southern Somalia necessitates the 
cooperation of both states. It appears, says Farer that some form of confederation 
between Ethiopia and Somalia should be worked out.101 Political federation accompanied 
with economic integration offers the best means of reducing tension.  
 In this regard, I.M. Lewis believes that the most viable long-term solution would 
seem to lie in some form of a loose federation between Somalia and Ethiopia.102 Saadia 
Touval, too, considers federation as the most viable long-term solution to the problems of 
the sub-region, and  argues that the problems raised by Somali nationalism will ultimately 
find a solution on a federal basis with Ethiopia. 103 Similarly, there are some  other 
scholars  who hold the view that because of geographic, ethnic, cultural, political and 
economic considerations,  some type of federal or confederal form of association between 
Ethiopia and Somalia can be worked out in the future.104  
At the practical level, federation of the two countries is a new idea. As such, the 
hazards that a new idea encounters are many. If it has validity for enough people, and if 
the idea wins enough devoted supporters and stands the test of time, it may succeed in 
creating social movements. Some of the movements may seek reform, others may seek 
revolution. The reform movements would modify the existing social order. The 
revolutionary movements, in contrast, will challenge existing norms, ends, and means in 
order to create a new social order. The idea of confederation or federation of the two 
countries, however, has not reached that stage. There is no social movement or a strong 
public clamour for it. What is popular in the Horn of Africa today is the demand for 
change of regime in Ethiopia, and reconstitution the Somali State, and the threat posed by 
Islamic fundamentalism to the region.  
To propose federation between Ethiopia and Somalia, for instance, as the scholars 
have suggested, is an ideal proposal. But idealism should also be tempered with realism. 
If Somalia’s objective in federating with Ethiopia is to be able to annex the Ogaden, as 
President Osman proposed, it is a non-starter. It will be a cheap way of annexing one-
fifth of Ethiopia without firing even a single bullet.  Besides, the means and the end 
would be unacceptable to the Ethiopians.  Realism suggests that to begin with, Somalia 
must renounce its territorial claims to the Ogaden. After that, a series of cooperative 
agreements could be signed leading to the establishment of a free trade area, then 
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depending on the outcome, a customs union and eventually a common market could be 
conceived, leading to a federation. All this has to be built brick by brick. 
 As is evident, the positions of both countries are far apart.  A careful examination of 
the issues, however, reveals other factors that go beyond the conventional view. At the 
risk of oversimplifying very complex problems, we may identify the real issues as 
follows: First, it should be stated that there were no borders separating the two countries 
before 1897. Secondly, in the ecological conditions of the Horn of Africa, it is estimated 
that cattle need annually some eighteen sq .miles of land per head for grazing purposes.105 
This means that when a given area is exhausted of its water and pasture, cattle will have 
to move elsewhere for grazing purposes.  Under such circumstances, what is the legal 
meaning of a border or territorial dispute?  Third, there are Ethiopia’s justifiable trade 
needs for outlets to the Indian Ocean through Somalia’s ports. Fourth, there is also 
Somalia’s feeling of understandable and warranted insecurity because of   the question of 
the Wabi Shibele and Juba rivers. If Ethiopia were to build dams on these rivers, and 
there are plans, the consequences for Somalia would be most catastrophic. Then there is 
Somalia’s geographic shape, which creates a distance of some 480 kms between 
Mogadisho and Berbera that a road through the Ogaden could reduce by 50%. Finally, 
there is gas and oil in the Ogaden. That too has contributed its share to hostilities. These 
are some of the basic problems- problems neither ethnic nor religious, that one can see 
behind the façade of border disputes, the solutions to which could contribute enormously 
to the maintenance of peace and security. In effect, we could say that the essence of the 
conflicts emanate from the struggle to control scarce resources, and that the rational 
utilization of the resources through development cooperation, could promote measures 
calculated to benefit the interests of the peoples of the sub-region as a whole. If more 
attention was given to solve common socio-economic problems, the conflicts could be 
considerably minimized, 106 and the opportunity for external mischief, including Islamic 
fundamentalism, considerably reduced.   
If the idea of sub-regional economic cooperation and integration recommended by 
IGAD and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa is therefore to be 
realized, in whatever form or shape Somalia is reconstituted, it will have to renounce its 
territorial claims to the Ogaden. In such a set-up, economic cooperation can be launched 
as a realistic venture and be built brick by brick.  There is a symbiotic linkage between 
peace and security on one hand, and economic growth and social development on the 
other. If the sub-region is not to be a fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalism, ways and 
means will have to be found to speed up economic growth and social development.   In 
fact, once an atmosphere of trust and confidence prevails, cooperative agreements in 
different areas could be advanced to pave the way for joint exploration and exploitation 
of resources for mutual benefit. The building of the common infrastructure, for instance, 
will not only facilitate trade, but is a primary condition for effective cooperation in such 
areas as human settlement, agriculture, manufacturing, and industry. As the economies of 
the countries of the sub-region evolve from predominantly subsistence into modern 
surplus economies, the interdependence between different regions for sources of supply 
and markets can be enhanced and further cooperation made possible. With the passage of 
time, there could be a customs union leading to a common market and eventually to a 
federation.  
Areas of Cooperation:  
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Very few scholars have studied the physical, historical, cultural, and economic 
links of the two countries. This is a subject that has not attracted the attention of 
researchers and academicians. The stress has always been on what divides them rather 
than on what unites them. The two countries function as two separate states, but they are 
also very interdependent. In physical characteristics such as climate, soils, and rivers, 
they are essentially complementary. They also share similar ethnological characteristics 
as well as cultural fusion. Common population groups straddle their common boundaries 
and spill-over across international frontiers.107 
In this respect, cooperation between Somalia and Ethiopia should be understood 
to mean the coordination, harmonization and institutionalization of particular inter-state 
activities for the deliberate purpose of facilitating growth and development. The two 
countries are faced with massive problems. Instead of constantly preparing themselves to 
fight one another, their energies and finances could be meaningfully directed to 
addressing social and economic development problems, and to enhancing mutual 
security. If the relative shortage in factor endowments can be compensated for by some 
common and satisfactory arrangements, the cooperation envisaged would contribute 
meaningfully to growth and development. In fact, the key to solving political differences 
lies in broadening the mutuality of interests through concrete programmes of economic 
and social cooperation.108  
  The creation and establishment of transport and other means of communication 
which link the two countries is absolutely essential for effective cooperation. Cooperation 
in trade should not be seen in isolation from cooperation in other sectors, whether 
industry, agriculture, energy, or the development of human resources. There may be 
articles of which there is surplus production over and above domestic requirements which 
are at the same time imported from outside. There may also be articles of which the 
production in one, small at present because of the small domestic market, would probably 
increase in proportion to the expansion of the market. According to the IMF, in 1982 for 
example, Somalia’s imports from Ethiopia were valued at nearly 156 million Somali 
Shillings, while its exports to Djibouti were valued at nearly 3 million.  Given a common 
cooperative policy, and better means of transport and communication, these trade figures 
can increase considerably because there would be opportunities for trade creation and 
trade diversion.   
If the transport cost of say an Ethiopian product being exported through the   Port 
of Massawa, which is more than 1,000 kms from Southern Ethiopia, can be reduced by 
50% through the use of the Ports of Mogadisho or Kismayou in Somalia because of 
distance and better means of transport, the ultimate effect would be to lower delivery 
prices, to stimulate volume of sales and hence to increase employment opportunities and 
the gross national product in both countries. 
In the conditions of the Horn of Africa, it is estimated by civil engineers that on 
the average, primary roads can cost $150,000 per km. Secondary roads can cost $100,000 
per km, and feeder roads even less. The building of artery roads or upgrading existing 
ones like the Jijiga – Imi road or the Kebri Bayeh –Gode road, should be left to the 
governments concerned. Our major concerns are the roads that will open productive lands 
and that are sub-regional in character.    
 The labour force in all Somalia’s ports in 1980, which served 656 ships, was only 
2,800. But if Ethiopia were to use them, the labour force could increase substantially, and 
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there will be increased revenue for the central treasury. To be able to do that, the 154 kms 
Jijiga -Togo Uchale road; the 570 kms Gelib-Dolo road, the Mogadisho-Ferfer road, 350 
kms of which are completed, and the 1,000 kms Negele-Dolo-Mogadisho roads should, 
as the case may be, built or upgraded. These roads will open the virgin lands of southern 
and eastern Ethiopia for development and be linked economically with Somalia, which 
will be to the benefit of both countries.  
The harnessing of such rivers as the Wabi Shibelle and the Juba that have their 
headstreams in Ethiopia, and which are crucial for the livelihood of millions of people in 
both countries for food production, nomadic grazing, irrigated agriculture, settlement of 
nomads, re-forestation schemes, electricity production, and the like, requires cooperation 
of the peoples and governments of both countries.109. 
The Wabi Shibele and Juba Rivers:    
These are two important rivers on which Ethiopia and Somalia could cooperate 
for mutual benefit. In November 2006, for example, the two rivers had flooded. More 
than 1,000 livestock were destroyed and 280,000 people made homeless. There was some 
damage in Gedo, the Middle and Lower Shebelle, the Middle and Lower Juba, and in 
some areas around Mogadisho. If there was cooperation between the two counties such 
damages would have been minimized.  
    While the irrigation potential of both rivers in Ethiopia is estimated as 627, 300 
hectares, it is 230, 000 hectares in Somalia, of which 199,000 hectares have already been 
brought under irrigation. Ethiopia is still in the planning stage. In view of the total 
available water resource, it will not be possible to irrigate all the areas proposed by both 
states. According to FAO, if 5kms3 of water is available for agricultural purposes, the total 
irrigation potential has to be reduced by 60% to 350, 000 hectares. Since Ethiopia has not 
developed a single hectare so far, it would be unfair to expect it to make the necessary 
sacrifice. Nevertheless, both countries could establish a joint Ethio-Somalia Water 
Commission for the purpose of exchanging information on both rivers, for joint 
utilization and apportionment of water resources, location of possible dam sites, and for 
utilization of power. 
The Wabi Shibelle: 
The Wabi Shibele River originates in Ethiopia and flows to Somalia. Over 90% of 
the discharge of the river originates from runoff in the Ethiopian highlands. The surface 
water resources in Ethiopia are estimated at 3.2 km3   year. Within Somalia, the discharge 
decreases rapidly as a result of losses by seepage, evaporation and over bank spillage due 
to a low channel capacity.110  The irrigation potential of the river in Ethiopia is 204, 000 
hectares111, whereas in Somalia, if the flow could be regulated, it is some 60,000 
hectares. The river basin study in Ethiopia   was completed in the early1970s, at the cost 
of $10 million by a group of French firms. A dam has already been built at Melka 
Wakena. It regulates 600 million cubic meters of water, and generates some 150 MW of 
electricity. It has linked with the interconnected system of electricity and supplies such 
neighbouring towns as Harar, Dire Dawa and Jijiga. Plans call for settling 500,000 
people. Here is an opportunity for settling the nomads of the Ogaden, as well as a 
significant number of farmers from the over- crowded Ethiopian highlands.  Research 
results also indicate that crops like cotton, bananas, sugar cane, citrus fruits, vegetables, 
tobacco, and corn can be cultivated. Research results also indicate that 25 quintals of seed 
cotton, 45 quintals of corn, and 60 quintals of rice can be produced per hectare. The basin 
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is also excellent for livestock. Export potential through the ports of Somalia is 
considerable.112 Somalia has plans to develop 25, 000 hectares of land by exploiting the 
Wabi Shibele. If the plan is to be successful, it stands to reason that agreement with 
Ethiopia would be absolutely essential.  
The Juba River: 
The Juba River, too, and all its tributaries have their sources in Ethiopia. The 
annual water flow is estimated at 5.9 km3 a year. The river crosses Somalia for a distance 
of 875 kms and is one of the important rivers in the sub-region. Its discharge within 
Somalia decreases for the same reason as the Wabi Shibelle. It can also cease to flow in 
the early part of the year. Due to geological conditions, its discharge in Ethiopia is almost 
three times as much as the Wabi Shibelle.  Thousands of hectares of land in Ethiopia can 
be developed through irrigation for growing such crops as peanuts, sunflower, cotton, 
sesame, ramie, and ken of. The river has also a high energy potential, and Ethiopia has 
plans to build dams both for irrigation and also for generating electricity to supply such 
towns as Moyale, Negele, and Borena. The 162 MW Genale hydro-electric dam is being 
built. The terrain in Somalia is not suitable for regulating the flow of the river. Since the 
country cannot fully exploit the potential of the river, much valuable water ends up in the 
Indian Ocean. Somalia wants to build the Bardeehera Dam at the cost of $780 million on 
the Juba to develop some 170, 000. In view of Ethiopia’s plans, Somalia has reduced its 
share to irrigate only 50,000 hectares.  and to generate 100 mw hydro-electric power. The 
engineers think of the project as being costly. They also feel that it will have a negative 
environmental impact on the region.113 If Somalia were to come into an agreement with 
Ethiopia and coordinate its activities with Addis Ababa, the hydro-electric and irrigation 
dams could be jointly financed and built in Ethiopia with less cost where the terrain is 
suitable and where the water could be easily regulated. Somalia would still get the 
electricity and a regulated supply of water. In that way, it could avoid being a one- crop 
and one- season producer. 
Natural Gas and Oil: 
An estimated 4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 13.6 million barrels of 
associated liquids have been discovered in one well alone in Calub, in the Ogaden 
Province of Eastern Ethiopia. Given the current price of natural gas at the well-head of 
$4.00 in the USA, the monetary value of the gas may be computed at $16 billion. Its life 
span is estimated at forty years. In order to exploit the deposits, a 375-mile natural gas 
pipe-line and a series of processing plants, including a cryogenic liquids plant and two 
gas-to-liquids process systems with capacity to process 200 million cubic feet of natural 
gas a day, are to be built at Awash, 75 miles east of Addis Ababa. Synthetic fuels and 
petrochemical feed stocks as well as steam that will generate electricity and portable 
water will also be produced. 
The Houston-based Sicor private company has signed $1.4 billion joint venture to 
develop the natural gas reserves. The planned refinery is estimated to produce products 
like diesel, gasoline, kerosene, and jet fuels. The gas-to-liquids process system will 
produce some 500 tons of ammonia per day as feedstock for the plant to be constructed. 
Apart from providing liquid propane gas, electricity, water, and fertilizers for domestic 
use, the gas can be used for refrigeration, cooling of houses, cooking, heating, and for 
water pumping purposes for human, agricultural, and animal use. The project will 
generate other fuel products for export, including urea and acetic acid. It can also 
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substitute ethanol for gasoline and natural gas for transport, which will greatly improve 
Ethiopia’s foreign exchange position. But more important, Ethiopia is a country which, 
like all the countries of the sub-region, still uses wood for fuel, as a result of which it 
continues to suffer from massive deforestation and soil erosion.114 
 Substituting gas for wood and charcoal will have a major impact in stabilizing the 
ecology of the two countries and in the rehabilitation of the land through afforestation 
and reforestation programmes, which in turn will have a very positive impact on the 
ecology in combating drought and desertification in the sub-region.  The positive impact 
of the project for the Horn of Africa is such that Ethiopia will be the lowest cost supplier 
for Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and Eritrea. The geological formations on the Somali 
side of the border are not also different from the Ogaden. Such reserves as there may be 
seem as likely to be found on one side of the frontier as on the other. To that end, an 
agreement on joint development, including the laying down of a pipeline to one of the 
ports of Somalia, could be worked out with the Somali authorities. However, as of 
December 2,002, work on Calub Gas has ceased because the World Bank refused to 
release the $74 million loan promised to the government earlier. The reason for this is 
that the World Bank insists that the whole project be privatized. The government’s failure 
to privatize Calub is attributed by reliable sources to the $98 million upfront payment that 
the government has been demanding from potential investors.  
By way of a conclusion, it should be noted that Djibouti’s independence and 
sovereignty has been recognized by Somalia, and former President Gouled had obtained a 
reiteration of Somalia’s renounciation of any claims on Djibouti’s territory.115  With 
regard to Kenya, despite the existence of the so-called Northern Frontier District 
Liberation Front, in June 1981, at the 18th Summit Conference of the OAU in Nairobi, 
Siad Barre had declared that Somalia was not seeking any territorial gains from Kenya, 
and that it had no territorial ambitions or claims on Kenya.116 With regard to Ethiopia, we 
may be tempted to conclude that because the political elite in Somalia is set in its ways, it 
would never renounce its dream of uniting the Ogaden with Somalia.  But the truth is, 
there have been times also when the Somali leadership was willing to seek peaceful 
accommodation with Ethiopia. In fact, in the 1960s the government of President 
Shermarke and Prime Minister Egal seemed to be backing away from the Ogaden issue 
and striking a deal with Ethiopia by tacitly renouncing Mogadisho’s irredentist claim to 
the province.  After Egal met Haile Selassie in September 1969, emergency regulations 
were lifted along the Ethiopia-Somali border. 117 
There was also a meeting between Mengistu Haile Mariam and Siad Barre in 
Djibouti from January 18-19, 1986.118 However, because Mengistu demanded that 
Somalia pay $1billion in war compensation, and make public abandonment of its claims 
on the Ogaden, the proxy war continued into 1988.  Furthermore, on April 3, 1988, a 
second meeting took place which resulted in the signing of a   peace treaty calling for the 
mutual withdrawal of forces from the Ethio-Somali border area, a reopening of 
diplomatic relations, and the cessation of support for each other’s dissidents. 119 To crown 
it all, by a “secret clause” Siad Barre agreed to accept the existing border and, in essence, 
to renounce the Somali claims on the Ogaden.120  
Moreover, not all Somali clans are intransigent believers in “Greater Somalia”.  
Annexing the Ogaden holds a greater potency for the Somali clans of the south than for 
those of the north. Indeed, the Ogaden issue remains a fundamental part of Ogadeeni and 
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Darod clan agenda. In contrast, it is viewed with antipathy by other clans like the 
Hawyie, and the northerners – the Ishaque and the Dulbahante - in particular, who want 
the Ogaden issue to disappear.121 
The dominant theme of official Somali thinking over the last four decades, no 
doubt, had been that continued fighting would eventually wear Ethiopia down. But 
Ethiopia did not collapse. If anything, it is the Somali state that has collapsed and the 
Somali society that has disintegrated. Anarchy and the establishment of clan fiefdoms 
have become the order of the day in today’s Somalia. Indeed, as an acute observer of the 
scene put it: Somalia attempted to lift a huge stone, only to drop it on itself.  
  As a result, some Somali intellectuals have gone into soul-searching and have 
been prompted to seriously question the very existence of the state and society over 
which the political struggle had been waged during the last four decades. They have even 
begun to question the historical and cultural assumptions on which the Somali state 
seems to rest. They are to be congratulated. They have taken upon themselves a colossal 
task that is both worthy and challenging.  One hopes that they will also question the 
fundamental premise on which “Greater Somalia” rests. It is recklessness and lack of 
wisdom and prudence on the part of past Somali leadership that has denied the people 
peace, stability and the possibilities of gainful cooperation with all their neighbours. One 
hopes that the country’s intellectuals succeed where their leaders have failed, in uniting 
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